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Abstract: With the substantial upsurge of container traffic, the container leas-
ing company thrives on the financial benefits and operational flexibility of leasing
containers requested by shippers. In practice, container lease pricing problem is
different from the consumer product pricing in consideration of the fair value of
container, limited customer types and monopolistic supply market. In view of the
durability of container and the diversified lease time and quantity, the pricing is a
challenging task for the leasing company. This paper examines the monopolist’s
nonlinear pricing problems in static and dynamic environments. In particular,
the leasing company designs and commits a menu of price and hire quantity/time
pairs to maximize the expected profit and in turn customers choose hire quan-
tities/time to maximize their surpluses according to their hire preferences. In
a static environment, closed-form solutions are obtained for different groups of
customers with multiple types subject to capacity constraint. In a dynamic en-
vironment, we address two customer types and derive closed-form solutions for
the problem of customers with hire time preference. Further, we show that the
effect of the capacity constraint increases with time of the planning horizon when
customers have the same hire time preference; while in the case with different
hire time preferences, the capacity constraint has opposite effects on the low and
high type customers. Last, the case of customers with hire quantity preference is
discussed. We focus on the lease with alternative given sets of hire time and use
dynamic programming to derive the numerical optimal hire time sequence.
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1 Introduction
In the past two decades, global container trade has witnessed a substantial
upsurge growing from 28.7 million TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit)s in 1990 to
161 million TEUs in 2013 (UNCTAD 2014). In contrast to the thriving container
trade, the leasing companies’ share of world container fleet does not change much,
from 43.2% of 6.4 million in 1990 to 46.2% of 34.4 million in 2013 (Drewry 2014).
The relatively stable share of leasing company in ownership partially reveals the
strong demand of shipping companies whose needs are satisfied by lessors flexible
services. From the lessor’s perspective, the leasing company1 could enjoy the
economies of scale by the procurement of large numbers of containers, efficient
utilization and access to raise capital at a competitive rate in a volatile economy.
From the lessee’s perspective, renting containers could serve as a financial tool
with the following advantages.
• Conserving capital. Instead of purchasing containers, the shipping com-
panies are relieved from the burden of the huge expenditure on containers.
It is reasonable especially when the new container price is too high or it is
difficult to raise finance for container investment such as in the recession year
of 2009. This reserves lessee’s limited borrowing capacity for more profitable
investments, such as infrastructure depots and IT facilities.
• Providing a better fiscal picture. The lease is usually qualified as pre-
tax expense and considered as ‘off-balance-sheet financing’. The monthly
payment appears on the balance sheet as expense rather than long term
debt.
• Avoiding risk. With fixed and predictable payment on container lease, the
shipper is protected from inflation.
Besides the financial benefits, the operational advantages of renting containers to
supplement their own fleet are as follows.
1For variety, we use lessor, leasing company, monopolist interchangeably without confusion.
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• Quick response to demand changes. Some shipping lines have extremely
high imbalance container flows owing to imbalance of trade volume between
continents. For instance, in 2013, the container moving from Asia to North
America (13.8 Million TEUs) is about twice of that from North America
to Asia (7.4 million TEUs). The imbalance between Asia and Europe is
even bigger with ratio 14.1:6.4 (UNCTAD 2014). The consequence of such
a imbalance cargo flow is the higher cost per TEU for these routes, which
is a difficult task in capacity management to the shipping companies. In
addition, the trade volume and the demand of containers are high during
peak seasons such as Christmas. After holidays, the demand falls back to
a low level. Therefore, it is reasonable to rent containers for fluctuating
seasonal demand or imbalance cargo routes.
• High flexibility. It is convenient for a shipper to pick up/drop off containers
at the nearest depot and select the most suitable lease contracts to satisfy
their needs. When the lease period expires, the lessee could return, purchase,
re-lease or replace the leased containers.
• Cost Saving. The shippers receive carefully designed services with high
quality control, unique depot selection, professional repair and the disposal
of used containers. The leasing service reduces costs such as overhead cost,
maintenance cost, finance cost and administrative cost.
The container lease contracts can be divided into two categories: master lease
and term lease. Master lease is also referred to a full service lease. Both parties
agree on a master contract: the shipper has the right to pick up/drop off container
at his convenience and changes the number of leased containers under the basic
terms. The lessor is responsible for repositioning the empty containers and the
maintenance and repair. The term lease has fixed lease duration including short
and long terms, ranging from a single-trip lease up to eight years rent. Unlike a
master lease, the lessee is responsible for the maintenance and repair of containers.
In the container leasing industry, pricing is a very challenging factor for a
leasing company. The main characteristics of container lease are the fair value of
container, stable and limited customer types and monopolistic supply market. (1)
Fair value of container. A container is labeled as an industrial product and
durable good. Its value is much higher than those of daily commodities but lower
than those of precision equipment. The average ex-factory price for newbuild
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TEU and resale price for used TEU in 2013 are US$2150 and US$1260 respec-
tively (Drewry 2014). (2) Limited customer types. The target customers of
container lease are big shipping companies with long-term contractual relation-
ship. There are limited discrete customer types. In the changing lease market,
each customer (shipper) requests large numbers of container with diverse hire time
(from one month to five years) depending on his own demand. The varied lease
time and quantities of different customer types in container lease meet the re-
quirement for second-degree price discrimination mechanism (different prices for
distinct quantities). In other words, the leasing company should pay attention
to the characteristics of each customer in the price determination process which
is the essence of the nonlinear pricing problem. By contrast, in service pricing,
the target customers are individual customers who usually demand for one unit
without any contractual relationship and have wide variety of customer types. (3)
Monopolistic supply market. The container leasing industry has been dom-
inated by a small groups of influential companies about two decades. The top
ten companies control 87.5% of the entire lease fleet. The top tier is headed by
long-standing number one, Taxtainer Group. Its fleet is about 40% bigger than
its nearest competitor (Drewry, 2014). This is the reason why the monopolist
supply market is studied in our paper. In practice, the lease rate determined by
a leasing company is usually based on the past leasing experience. Thus it is
necessary to have a scientific method assisting the leasing company on the pricing
determination process.
Based on the main features of container lease, the price and discount affect
customers’ intention to deal, hire time and quantity. The more favorable price
offered to longer hire time and larger lease quantity incurs an opportunity cost,
resulting in inadequate capacity of containers that affects the lessor from gaining
future profit from other customers. On the other hand, higher price deters con-
sumers’ interest to rent and cause more idle capacity. There is clearly a need for
identifying the hire discount and time discount in the lease system given a capac-
ity constraint. Thus, in this paper, we investigate the static and dynamic rental
revenue management problem considering several situations (short-term lease and
long-term lease) in practice. The company commits a price menu with hire quan-
tity (time) to maximize the expected profit and in turn customers choose their
hire quantities/time to maximize their surpluses based on their hire preferences. In
Section 3, the company allocates the capacity once in a static environment. Closed
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form solutions are obtained for different groups of customers subject to capacity
constraint. In Section 4, the company allocates the finite capacity repeatedly in
the planning horizon. For the case of customers with hire time preference in Sec-
tion 4.1, closed-form solutions are derived and the effect of capacity constraint are
discussed. For the case of customers with hire quantity preference in Section 4.2,
we adopt dynamic programming to acquire the numerical optimal solution and
discuss the effect of parameters on the optimal solution.
2 Literature Review
Our work is built on three streams of literature: study about rental service
system, static and dynamic mechanism design.
There is a burgeoning scholarly literature on the rental systems. Recent related
study about rental systems mostly concentrate on the following major problems,
empty container reposition problem in some regions with imbalance inbound and
outbound traffic (Song and Dong, 2012, Bell et al., 2013), capacity rationing prob-
lem for different customer types (Savin et al., 2005, Papier and Thonemann, 2010).
Besides, Gans and Savin (2007) study the rental/service revenue management and
capacity allocation problem as queuing model. In queuing model, once the price
is accepted by the customer, the rental duration is a given parameter following
exponential distribution rather than a specific rental time selected by each con-
sumer. Dobbs (1995) examines a monopolist’s inter-temporal nonlinear pricing
problem with unit/excess capacity where customers arrive randomly and choose
their hire time. Polynomial function is utilized to represent the price schedule.
The optimal pricing policy is sensitive to customer arrival frequency but insensi-
tive to changes in time discount rate. Dobbs captures the main feature of rental
system—customers have the option of selecting the hire time. In his model, same
type customers select the same hire time which is history independent in the infi-
nite horizon. To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper analyzing the pricing
and capacity rationing problem in the context of container leasing industry.
Various study about static mechanism design problem addresses the dynamics
between customer information and the company’s pricing schedule. This line of
research starts with the seminal work of Mussa and Rosen (1978). They explore a
monopolist’s price-quality schedule allocating quality-differentiated goods to cus-
tomers under self-selection constraint. In Myerson (1981), his contribution to the
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literature on unidimensional continuous customer types is the identification of the
optimal auction structure to attain the criterion (e.g. social welfare maximization,
customer purchasing cost minimization). Maskin and Riley (1984) demonstrate
that under a separability assumption, the seller’s optimal price-quantity schedule
has the quantity-discount structure. Based on these pioneer works, the mecha-
nism design theory of pricing has been applied to information goods (Sundarara-
jan, 2004), multiproduct (Armstrong, 1996), parking slot assignment (Zou et al.,
2015) and transportation service procurement (Huang and Xu, 2013).
The dynamic mechanism design literature can be classified by two strands of
literature according to the nature of dynamics. One strand of literature primar-
ily focuses on the setting that a dynamic population arrives over time with fixed
preference and the allocation for each customer is determined only once (Pai and
Vohra, 2013, Zou et al., 2015). The other strand considers a fixed population whose
preference evolves over time and allocation for each customer is determined repeat-
edly. Our paper is more relevant to this strand of literature. Battaglini (2005)
investigates the optimal contract between a monopolist and a customer whose
valuation follows a Markov process in an infinite horizon. The optimal contract
is non-stationary and converges to efficient contract over time. The differences
between our paper and Battaglini’s work are that we consider multiple customers,
one more dimension of product characteristics (hire time) and capacity constraint.
Athey and Segal (2013), Kakade et al. (2013), Pavan et al. (2014) study the social
welfare maximization and incentive compatible mechanisms in dynamic environ-
ments. Athey and Segal (2013) construct a budge-balanced mechanism in general
dynamic environments. Kakade et al. (2013) explore the optimal mechanism de-
sign in separable environments with dynamic private information. They employ
a relaxation method to first find an allocation rule in the relaxed environment
and then determine the allocation rule is ex post incentive compatible under the
restriction that each agent needs to report his entire type history in each period.
Pavan et al. (2014) adopt the first-order approach to study mechanism design in
dynamic quasilinear environment which each agent has a dynamic unidimensional
private information. Battaglini and Lamba (2014) examine a dynamic principal-
agent model in which the agent’s types are serially correlated and follow a Markov
process. They show a dynamic envelope formula considering only local incentive
compatibility constraints but the formula fails to characterize the optimal dy-
namic contract in general dynamic environments. So they present the suboptimal
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monotonic contracts which works well in complex environments. Bergemann and
Said (2011) provide a detailed review of dynamic mechanism design. However,
the above studies on dynamic mechanism design assume that the characteristic
of product only has the quantity dimension or quality dimension under unit de-
mand assumption, in our paper, we extend the problem with consideration of two
dimensions, hire quantity and hire time. We believe that this is the first paper to
consider two dimensional features of product in a dynamic environment.
3 Static Nonlinear Pricing Problem
In this section, we discuss an atemporal monopolist nonlinear pricing problem
where the capacity is rationed once. In the next section, we study the intertem-
poral nonlinear pricing problem where the capacity is allocated repeatedly in the
finite horizon.
In this paper, the cases we focus on that the lessee has hire quantity/time
preference are motivated by industry operations. The short term lease is also
called spot lease or trip lease. The lease is provided on a short term period (month,
quarter) or specific route basis with predetermined delivery schedule (Theofanis
and Boile, 2009, Drewry, 2014). The liner ship carrier announces the ports of
call of a specific route with specific estimated time of arrival and departure. This
information is usually known in advance and considered constant. The shippers
will then make reservation to occupy certain capacity (in TEUs) of a voyage with
specific origin-destination pair. They will consider rent the containers from the
leasing company for this specific shipment if their own containers is insufficient.
If the route of the liner shipping service has only one origin-destination port, the
hire time of all customers are considered the same; if there are multiple ports
of call, this leads to the situation that customers may have different hire time
preferences. The leasing company enters into long-term leases for a fixed term
normally ranging from three to eight years, with five-year term leases being most
common (Textainer, 2014). In the long term lease, the shipper enquires their
strategic partners or open calls for tenders to choose the alternative lessor. The
final winner may be a sole bidder or two/three bidders who share the contract.
Under the agreement of preferred hire time (quantity), the hire quantity (time) is
decided based on the price offered by leasing companies.
Besides the industry practice, the existing literature about empty container al-
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location and reposition also supports the hire quantity or hire preference assump-
tion. Cheung and Chen (1998), Shu and Song (2013) study the empty container
reposition problem. Based on the fixed ship schedules and voyages, the line ship-
per knows that the time of departure and arrival for each vessel at any port and
then determines the number of container repositioned/owned and the number of
leased containers. Bell et al. (2013) discusses a cost-based container assignment
model which the shipper has hire quantity preference and then decides the leg flow
and dwell time to minimize the total cost.
3.1 One group of customers
The monopolist (leasing company) has C units of container available to rent
by M customers at one time. In this subsection, we assume that all M customers
have the same hire time d. This assumption is reasonable as in the long-term
lease contract five year is the most common hire time. A customer usually has
a preferred hire time and then choose the hire quantity depending on the posted
price. Further, in view of the sufficient long hire time, the market would be quite
different from now when the containers are returned. Hence, it is more sensible
to model this pricing problem in the long-term lease contract as an atemporal
nonlinear pricing problem. The company determines a vector of quantity and
price pairs associated with each customer type to maximize the expected profit
and each customer selects the hire quantity and price pair designed for his type.
The M customers are classified into N types, where M < N . A customer’s
valuation refers to the benefit that a customer obtains from the leasing service.
A customer’s valuation, θ¯i ∈ Θ¯, is private information and drawn from a known
iid probability mass function f(θ¯i) and cumulative distribution function F (θ¯i),
shortened as fi and Fi respectively. Θ¯ = {θ¯1, θ¯2, . . . , θ¯N} is a finite set with
θ¯i = iψ for some ψ > 0. Assume that fi and Fi satisfy the monotone hazard rate
condition, if j > i then
1−Fj
fj
> 1−Fi
fi
. This assumption is quite usual in literature
(Anderson and Dana Jr, 2009, Armstrong, 1996, Myerson, 1981). A customer rents
qi units of container for hire time di enjoys utility U(θ¯i, di, qi) = θ¯idiqi− 12(d2i +q2i ).
The quadratic utility function follows the tradition of the literature (Rochet and
Stole, 2003, Sundararajan, 2004, Wilson, 1993). Let Y be the fixed lease contract
setup cost. The operating cost per time per unit for the leasing company is a and
a < ψ. The unit benefit ψ obtained by the customer could not lower than the
operating cost per unit a of the leasing company. The direct operating expense
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includes storage, handling, maintenance, and reposition. Such operating cost is a
component of the objective function of these empty container reposition articles
(Bell et al., 2013, Cheung and Chen, 1998, Song and Dong, 2012), which is linear in
the number of containers and the duration of the lease contract. The adoption of
linear cost function is just to simplify exposition, and it is easy to extend to some
other forms of cost function. In this section with same hire time d, let θi = θ¯id
and U(θ¯i, di, qi) becomes to U(θi, qi) = θiqi − 12(d2 + q2i ).
The Company’s Problem
The objective of the leasing company is to maximize the expected profit with
finite capacity. In the direct revelation mechanism, the leasing company first
announces and commits a menu of quantity qi and price Pi pairs for 1 ≤ i ≤
N , shortened as {Q,P}. When a customer arrives at the leasing company, the
customer reports a type i based on the announced menu {Q,P} to maximize the
surplus U(θi, qi) − Pi. The customer receives qi units of container and issues the
payment Pi.
There are some constraints in which the direct revelation mechanism must
satisfy.
Incentive Compatibility (ICij) Constraint. Each customer reports his type
i truthfully and selects the quantity and price pair {qi, Pi} offered to his type.
Customer has no incentive to deviate from his type i as the consumer surplus
of reporting type i is greater than that reporting other types j (j 6= i). Thus,
truthfulness is the best strategy to maximize his own consumer surplus.
U(θi, qi)− Pi ≥ U(θi, qj)− Pj ∀i and j where j 6= i (1)
Refer ICi,i+1 to the upward IC constraint and ICi,i−1 to the downward IC con-
straint.
Individual Rationality (IRi) Constraint. Each customer only rents the con-
tainers if he has nonnegative consumer surplus.
U(θi, qi)− Pi ≥ 0 ∀i (2)
Due to the IRi constraint, there exists some customers obtaining positive con-
sumer surpluses, meanwhile some types of customers are priced out of the market.
There exists a type j such that qj = 0 which divides all customers into two cate-
gories, for customers with type k ≤ j, qk = 0; otherwise, for j < k ≤ N , qk > 0.
In other words, the types of customers who belonged to [1, j] fail to accept the
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price and leave the company; and the types of customers who belonged to (j,N ]
hire a positive quantity with nonnegative consumer surplus.
Capacity Constraint (CC). The total units of container allocated cannot exceed
the available capacity.
M
∑
i
fiqi ≤ C (3)
The expected profit of the leasing company is the expected revenue minus the
fixed setup cost and the operating cost. The atemporal nonlinear pricing problem
is written as follows.
Π(Q,P ) = max
{Q,P}
M
∑
i
fi(Pi − Y − adqi) (4)
s.t. ICij, IRi, CC ∀i, j ∈ [1, · · · , N ]
Lemma 3.1. If a mechanism {Q,P} is implementable, then qi ≥ qj for any
1 ≤ j < i ≤ N .
Proof. Suppose that qi < qj for i > j. From ICi,j and ICj,i constraints, we have
ICi,j U(θi, qi)− Pi ≥ U(θi, qj)− Pj,
ICj,i U(θj, qj)− Pj ≥ U(θj, qi)− Pi.
The above two inequalities imply that
θi(qj − qi) ≤ Pj − Pi + 1
2
(q2j − q2i ) ≤ θj(qj − qi).
According to assumption θi > θj and qj > qi, we obtain that θi(qj−qi) > θj(qj−qi),
yielding a contradiction.
Denote the consumer surplus of type i as S(θi) = U(θi, qi)− Pi.
Lemma 3.2. If a mechanism {Q,P} is implementable, then for all customer types
i,
S(θi) ≥ S(θ1) + ψd
i−1∑
k=1
qk (5)
S(θi) ≤ S(θ1) + ψd
i∑
k=2
qk (6)
10
Proof. From ICi,i−1, we have
S(θi) = U(θi, qi)− Pi ≥ U(θi, qi−1)− Pi−1.
And the right side of the above equation can be rewritten as
U(θi, qi−1)− Pi−1
=U(θi−1, qi−1)− Pi−1 + U(θi, qi−1)− U(θi−1, qi−1)
=S(θi−1) + ψdqi−1.
Accordingly, we have S(θi) ≥ S(θi−1) +ψdqi−1. Summing up the constraints from
ICi,i−1 to IC2,1, we get
S(θi) ≥ S(θ1) + ψd
i−1∑
k=1
qk.
Similarly, summing up the constraints from ICi−1,i to IC1,2 and we obtain (6).
Lemma 3.3. If the adjacent downward (upward) IC constraint binds, then the
corresponding upward (downward) IC constraint is satisfied.
Proof. If ICi,i−1 binds, U(θi, qi)− U(θi, qi−1) = Pi − Pi−1. Recall that U(θi, qi) =
θiqi − 12(d2 + q2i ), then
θi−1(qi − qi−1) + 1
2
(q2i−1 − q2i ) = U(θi−1, qi)− U(θi−1, qi−1)
< U(θi, qi)− U(θi, qi−1) = θi(qi − qi−1) + 1
2
(q2i−1 − q2i ).
It follows that U(θi−1, qi)−U(θi−1, qi−1) < Pi−Pi−1. The upward ICi−1,i constraint
is satisfied.
The atemporal nonlinear pricing problem with capacity constraint can be
transformed to a standard static nonlinear pricing problem using the Lagrange
multiplier approach. Based on the above lemmas, we could consider the relaxed
problem which the adjacent downward ICi,i−1 and IR1 constraints bind. The
binding constraint IR1 means that S(θ1) = 0 and the binding constraints ICi,i−1
indicates that S(θi) = ψd
∑i−1
k=1 qk. As a result, the optimal menu of prices can be
derived from the binding downward IC constraints. Replace Pi = U(θi, qi)−S(θi)
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and reformulate the problem (4) as
Π(Q, λ) = max
{Q,λ}
M
∑
i
fi[U(θi, qi)− S(θi)− Y − adqi] + λ(C −M
∑
i
fiqi) (7)
s.t. S(θ1) = 0 IR1
S(θi) = ψd
i−1∑
k=1
qk ICi,i−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ N
Theorem 3.1. The optimal allocation policy of atemporal nonlinear pricing prob-
lem is characterized as follows. Let wi = i− 1−Fifi and i∗ = arg min{i|wi > aψ}.
• If (i∗− a
ψ
)(1−Fi∗−1) ≤ CMdψ , then the capacity constraint is not binding. For
i < i∗, the optimal quantity qi is 0; for i∗ ≤ i ≤ N , qi = dψwi − ad.
• If (i∗ − a
ψ
)(1 − Fi∗−1) > CMdψ , then the capacity constraint is binding. For
i < i∗, the optimal quantity qi is 0; for i∗ ≤ i ≤ N , qi = dψwi−ad−λ where
λ = dψi∗ − ad− C
M(1−Fi∗−1) .
Proof. (i) When the capacity constraint is not binding, then λ = 0 and the prob-
lem becomes a standard nonlinear pricing problem. Take the derivative of (7)
w.r.t θi, we can get
fi(idψ − ad− qi − dψ1− Fi
fi
) = 0,
qi = dψwi − ad.
For i < i∗, qi = 0; otherwise, qi = dψwi − ad. Since capacity constraint is not
binding, from M
∑N
i=i∗ fiqi ≤ C, we have (i∗ − aψ )(1− Fi∗−1) ≤ CMdψ .
(ii) When the capacity constraint is binding, using the Lagrange multiplier
approach, (7) can be rewritten as
Π(Q, λ) = max
{Q,λ}
M
∑
i
fi[θiqi − 1
2
(d2 + q2i )− S(θi)− Y − adqi − λqi] + λC
s.t. IR1, ICi,i−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ N
The pointwise maximization solution is derived from the derivative about θi com-
bining with the binding capacity constraint.fi(idψ − ad− qi − dψ
1−Fi
fi
− λ) = 0,
M
∑N
i=i∗ fiqi = C
⇒
qi = dψwi − ad− λλ = dψi∗ − ad− C
M(1−Fi∗−1)
The optimal allocation policy corresponding to the binding status of capacity
constraint is derived.
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Remark. The leasing company provides different rental contracts based on the
type of customers. The total number of customers who receive the lease contract
is M(1− Fi∗−1).
3.2 Two different groups of customers
In this subsection, we consider the case that the M customers are classified into
two groups: one group of customers has hire time preference, denoted by Group
I; another group of customers has hire quantity preference, denoted by Group
J . Let d¯i be the preferred hire time in Group I, d¯i ≤ d¯i+1 (i ∈ I) and q¯j is the
preferred hire quantity in Group J , q¯j ≤ q¯j+1 (j ∈ J). Assume that each group
still has N types. A customer’s valuation in Group I is θIi = id¯iψ and in Group
J is θJj = jq¯jξ for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , ψ > 0 and ξ > 0. The other assumptions are
the same as those stated in Section 3.1. The atemporal nonlinear pricing problem
with two different groups of customers can be formulated as
max
{QI ,PI ,DJ ,PJ}
M [
∑
i
fi(Pi − Y − ad¯iqi) +
∑
j
fj(Pj − Y − aq¯jdj)]
s.t. U(θIi , qi)− Pi ≥ U(θIi , qi′)− Pi′ ICIi,i′
U(θJj , dj)− Pj ≥ U(θJj , dj′)− Pj′ ICJj,j′
U(θIi , qi)− Pi ≥ 0, U(θJj , dj)− Pj ≥ 0 IRIi , IRJj
M [
∑
i fiqi +
∑
j fj q¯j1(dj > 0)] ≤ C CC
∀i, i′ ∈ I,∀j, j′ ∈ J
The first two constraints are incentive compatible constraints for both groups. The
next two constraints are individual rationality constraints. The last is the capacity
constraint, and 1(·) is an indicator function. The inequality (5) in Lemma 3.2
becomes to
S(θIi ) ≥ S(θI1) +
1
2
(d¯21 − d¯2i ) + ψ
i−1∑
k=1
qk[(k + 1)d¯k+1 − kd¯k];
S(θJj ) ≥ S(θJ1 ) +
1
2
(q¯21 − q¯2i ) + ξ
j−1∑
k=1
dk[(k + 1)q¯k+1 − kq¯k].
To solve this problem, we can still use Lagrange multiplier approach to obtain the
optimal solution.
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Theorem 3.2. The optimal allocation policy of atemporal nonlinear pricing prob-
lem with two different groups of customers is characterized as follows. The super-
scripts s and b signify the slack and binding status of the capacity constraint.
• When the capacity constraint is not binding, the optimal allocation policy is
that for Group I, qsi =
{
id¯iψ − ad¯i − [(i + 1)d¯i+1 − id¯i]1−Fifi ψ
}+
; for Group
J , dsj =
{
jq¯jξ − aq¯j − [(j + 1)q¯j+1 − jq¯j]1−Fjfi ξ
}+
.
• When the capacity constraint is binding, the optimal allocation policy is that
for Group I, qbi =
{
id¯iψ − ad¯i − [(i + 1)d¯i+1 − id¯i]1−Fifi ψ
}+ − λ where λ =
1
1−Fi∗−1
(∑
i≥i∗ fiq
s
i +
∑
j≥j∗ fj q¯j − CM
)
and i∗ = arg min{i|qsi ≥ 0}, j∗ =
arg min{i|dsj ≥ 0}; for Group J , dbj = dsj.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, thus the proof is omitted.
For Group I, when customers have the same preferred hire time, the optimal
allocation policy reduces to the optimal policy in Theorem 3.1 except with different
λ values. The capacity constraint only binds the optimal hire quantity qbi of Group
I, but not the optimal hire time dj of Group J owing to the fact that customers
in this group have preferred hire quantities.
4 Dynamic Nonlinear Pricing Problem
In this section, we discuss the monopolist’s nonlinear pricing problem in a dy-
namic environment. In particular, the monopolist determines a menu of quantity
(time) and price pairs to maximize the expected profit in discrete-time and finite
horizon setting. To better capture the characteristics of the two different groups
of customers, we explore the nonlinear pricing problem for customers with pre-
ferred hire time and preferred hire quantity separately. In the container lease, the
target customers are big shipping companies with long-term contractual relation-
ship. There are limited discrete customer types. Unlike in retail/service pricing,
the target customers are individual customers who usually demand for one unit of
product without any contractual relationship and have wide variety of customer
types. Thus, we first categorize customers by hire preference and then classify
customers according to the hire quantity or hire time. Two customer types are
used as a start to show the structure of the optimal pricing policy. Suppose that
there are two customer types in each group, the low type L and the high type H.
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4.1 Hire time preference
In this subsection, we describe the situation of a trip lease contract in the short
term lease category. Denote the preferred hire time of two customer types by d¯H
and d¯L. Corresponding to the different situations in practice, we first study the
case that d¯H = d¯L and then discuss the case when d¯H > d¯L. Let θi = θ¯id¯i and
θ¯i > a.
4.1.1 Same hire time preference (d¯H = d¯L = d)
As the M customers of the leasing company have the same hire time preference
d, there are equidistant time points in finite horizon, {0 = t0, t1, · · · , tK , tK+1 =
T}, where tk = kd and tK is the last pricing decision point. In a finite period
setting, customer type is affected by the shipper’s demand and fleet capacity, world
trade and economic conditions, the price of new and used containers, shifting trend
of cargo traffic and fluctuation in interest rates and currency exchange rates. The
above factors directly or indirectly affect the customer type at the leasing time.
Therefore, we model the customer valuation as stochastic variable. At time t0,
the company has a prior information about the proportion of customers being
classified into the low and high type, fL and fH . The customer type evolves over
time according to a Markov process. Let fij be the probability that a type i
customer at time point tk becomes a type j customer at time point tk+1 for any
tk, where i, j ∈ {L,H}. The probability fij is independent of the time point.
Moreover, assume that customer types are positively correlated, fHH − fHL > 0
and fLL − fLH > 0. Hk is the set of all possible history up to time tk. hzk is the
public history up to time point tk and the customer type at tk−1 is z (z ∈ {L,H}),
hzk := {hk−1, z} and h0 := ∅. hk stands for the general history up to time point tk.
Let f(hk) be the probability of history hk.
At each time point tk, the sequence of events is listed as follows: (1) if k ≥ 1,
contracted customers return the rented containers; (2) based on the public history
hk, the leasing company designs and commits a menu of quantity and price pairs
{Q,P} = {qi(hk), Pi(hk)} to maximize the expected profit with time discount
factor δ; (3) each customer reports his type to maximize his expected consumer
surplus, receives the corresponding quantity of his type and settles the payment.
Let S(θi|hk) be a customer’s expected surplus with type i up to history hk,
S(θi|hk) = U(θi, qi(hk))−Pi(hk)+δd
∑
j∈{L,H} fijS(θj|hik+1). For notational brevity,
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we denote qi(h0) := qi, S(θi|h0) := S(θi).
Incentive Compatibility (ICij(hk)) Constraint. In a dynamic environment, the
incentive compatibility constraint for the high type and history hk (k = 0, · · · , K)
can be written as
U(θH , qH(hk))− PH(hk) + δd
∑
j
fHjS(θj|hHk+1) ≥
U(θH , qL(hk))− PL(hk) + δd
∑
j
fHjS(θj|hLk+1)
Simplify the above inequality, it becomes
S(θH |hk) ≥ S(θL|hk) + ∆θqL(hk) + δd
∑
j
(fHj − fLj)S(θj|hLk+1)
where ∆θ = θH − θL = (θ¯H − θ¯L)d.
Individual Rationality (IRi(hk)) Constraint. The individual rationality con-
straint in a dynamic environment is S(θi|hk) ≥ 0 for hk ∈Hk.
Capacity Constraint (CC(hk)). In view of the same hire time for all customers,
the capacity constraint at each time point tk is that the total number of allocated
units cannot exceed C. At time t0, the capacity constraint is M(fHqH+fLqL) ≤ C.
When k > 0, Hk can be divided into three subsets, Hk = {hLˆk , hHk , hLk }, where
hLˆk = (L, · · · , L) is the consistent low-type history from time t0 to time tk−1 where
the customer types are all L in the first k time points; hHk = {hk−1, H} refers to
the history where the customer type at tk−1 is H and hLk = {hk−1, L} is the history
where the customer type at tk−1 is L and hk−1 6= hLk−1. Note that f(hL1 ) = 0. The
containers rented out at time point tk−1 will be returned to the company at the
time point tk. The capacity constraint at each time point tk can be expressed as
M
[
f(hLˆk )
∑
i
fLiqi(h
Lˆ
k ) + f(h
H
k )
∑
i
fHiqi(h
H
k ) + f(h
L
k )
∑
i
fLiqi(h
L
k )
]
≤ C
The monopolist’s problem boils down to as follows.
Π(Q,P ) = max
{Q,P}
M{
∑
i
fi(Pi − Y − adqi) +
K∑
k=1
δkdEhzk
∑
i
fzi[Pi(h
z
k)− Y − adqi(hzk)]}
= max
{Q,S(θ)}
M{
∑
i
fi[U(θi, qi)− S(θi)− Y − adqi]
+
K∑
k=1
δkdEhzk
∑
i
fzi[U(θi, qi(h
z
k))− Y − adqi]} (8)
s.t. ICij(hk), IRi(hk), CC(hk)
∀i, j ∈ {L,H}, hk ∈Hk (0 ≤ k ≤ K)
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Battaglini and Lamba (2014) proved that the first-order approach is valid for
the monotonic allocations in a dynamic environment, q(hk) ≥ q(hk′) if hk > hk′ ,
e.g. hk = {H,L} and hk′ = {L,L} in our problem. Since we only have two
customer types and unidimensional allocation under the monotone hazard rate
assumption, the monotonic allocation requirement is satisfied in our problem.
We adopt the relaxed method as presented in the standard static nonlinear pric-
ing problem where the the incentive compatibility constraints for the high type
ICHL(hk) and the individual rationality constraints for the low type IRL(hk) are
binding for any hk ∈ Hk. Define the relaxed problem as IRL(hk) and ICHL(hk)
are binding constraints for any hk ∈Hk.
Lemma 4.1. In a dynamic environment with same hire time preference, the op-
timal solution of the relaxed problem is also an optimal solution of the original
problem.
Proof. Suppose that {Q,P} is an optimal solution of the original problem which
IRL(hk) and ICHL(hk) are not binding constraints for some hk ∈Hk.
If IRL(hk) are not binding constraints for some hk ∈ Hk, that is, S(θL|hk) = ω,
where ω is a positive number.
• When k = 0, consider an alternative solution {Q′, S ′(θ)} such that S ′(θL) =
S(θL)−ω. Then the expected optimal profit increases by fLω, Π(Q′, S ′(θ)) =
Π(Q,P ) +MfLω.
• When k > 0, let S ′(θL|hk) = S(θL|hk)− ω, the expected profit remains the
same satisfying all constraints, Π(Q′, S ′(θ)) = Π(Q,P ).
If ICHL(hk) are not binding constraints for some hk ∈Hk, S(θH |hk) = ∆θqL(hk)+
δd∆fS(θH |hLk+1) + ω, where ∆f = fHH − fLH . Consider an alternative solution
{Q′, S ′(θ)} such that S ′(θH |hk) = S(θH |hk)− ω.
• When k = 0, the net change is fHω, Π(Q′, S ′(θ)) = Π(Q,P ) +MfHω.
• When k > 0 and k′ > k, S ′(θH |hk′) remains the same as in the original
solution, S ′(θH |hk′) = S(θH |hk′). When k′ = k − 1, we have S ′(θH |hk−1) =
S(θH |hk−1) − δdω. By repeatedly applying the above modifications until
k′ = 0, S ′(θH) = S(θH) − δkdω. The expected optimal profit increases by
MfHδ
kdω, Π(Q′, S ′(θ)) = Π(Q,P ) +MfHδkdω.
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Based on the above, the alternative solution satisfying the binding constraints
ICHL(hk) and IRL(hk) in the relaxed problem yields an equal or higher profit,
which contradicts the optimality of the assumption.
From the binding constraint ICHL(hk) in the relaxed problem,
S(θH |hk) = ∆θqL(hk) + δd∆fS(θH |hLk+1), where ∆f = fHH − fLH ,
the expected consumer surplus S(θH) is
S(θH) = S(θH |h0) = ∆θ
K∑
k=0
(δd∆f)kqL(h
Lˆ
k ).
As S(θL|hk) = 0 and S(θH) depends on qL(hLˆk ) for k = {0, 1, · · · , K}, reformulate
(8) as the Lagrangean objective function. The relaxed problem is written as
follows.
Π(Q,S(θH),Λ) = max{Q,S(θH),Λ}
M [
∑
i
fi(U(θi, qi)− Y − adqi)− fHS(θH)]
+M
K∑
k=1
δkdEhzk
∑
i
fzi[U(θi, qi(h
z
k))− Y − adqi(hzk)] + λ0(
C
M
− fHqH − fLqL)
+
K∑
k=1
λk[
C
M
− f(hLˆk )
∑
i
fLiqi(h
Lˆ
k )− f(hHk )
∑
i
fHiqi(h
H
k )− f(hLk )
∑
i
fLiqi(h
L
k )]
s.t. S(θL|hk) = 0 IRL(hk)
S(θH) = ∆θ
∑K
k=0(δ
d∆f)kqL(h
Lˆ
k ) ICHL(hk)
∀i ∈ {L,H}, hk ∈Hk (0 ≤ k ≤ K)
Theorem 4.1. For any hk ∈ Hk, the optimal intertemporal allocation policy for
customers with same hire time preference is characterized as follows.
At time 0,qH = θH − ad− Λ0;qL = θL − ad− fHfL ∆θ − Λ0; where Λ0 =
λ0
M
= (θL − ad− C
M
)+;
when hk ∈ {hHk , hLk }, when hk = hLˆk ,qH(hk) = θH − ad− Λk;qL(hk) = θL − ad− Λk;
qH(hLˆk ) = θH − ad− Λk;qL(hLˆk ) = θL − ad− fH∆θfL ( ∆ffLL )k − Λk;
where Λk =
λk
Mδkd
=
{
θL − ad− CM + ∆θ
[
fLH(f(h
Lˆ
k ) + f(h
L
k )) + f(h
H
k )fHH − fH∆fk
]}+
.
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Proof. When hk ∈ {hHk , hLk }, the first-order conditions w.r.t qH(hk) and qL(hk) are
given by the following equations.
qH(hk) : Mδ
kd[θH − ad− qH(hk)]− λk = 0
qL(hk) : Mδ
kd[θL − ad− qL(hk)]− λk = 0
When hk = h
Lˆ
k , the first-order conditions about qH(h
Lˆ
k ) and qL(h
Lˆ
k ) are given by
the following equations.
qH(h
Lˆ
k ) : Mδ
kd[θH − ad− qH(hLˆk )]− λk = 0
qL(h
Lˆ
k ) : Mδ
kd[θL − ad− qL(hLˆk )− fH∆θfL (
∆f
fLL
)k]− λk = 0
And Λk is obtained from the following equation[
f(hLˆk )
∑
i fLiqi(h
Lˆ
k ) + f(h
H
k )
∑
i fHiqi(h
H
k ) + f(h
L
k )
∑
i fLiqi(h
L
k )− CM
]+
= 0.
Corollary 4.1. For 0 ≤ k ≤ K, Λk is increasing2 in k.
Proof. We use induction to prove this lemma. For k = 1, Λ1 − Λ0 = fLH∆θ > 0.
Next, we show that if Λk − Λk−1 > 0, then also Λk+1 − Λk > 0 holds. Note that
f(hLˆk ) = f(h
Lˆ
k−1)fLL;
f(hLk ) = f(h
L
k−1)fLL + f(h
H
k−1)fHL;
f(hHk ) = f(h
H
k−1)fHH + f(h
L
k−1)fLH + f(h
Lˆ
k−1)fLH .
Λk − Λk−1
∆θ
=∆f
[
fLH
(
f(hLk−1) + f(h
Lˆ
k−1)
)
− fHLf(hHk−1)
]
+ fH∆f
k−1(1−∆f) > 0
Suppose that if the above equation is positive,
Λk+1 − Λk
∆θ
=fLH
[
f(hLˆk+1)− f(hLˆk ) + f(hLk+1)− f(hLk )
]
+ fHH
[
f(hHk+1)− f(hHk )
]
+ fH∆f
k(1−∆f)
=∆f
{
∆f
[
fLH
(
f(hLˆk−1) + f(h
L
k−1)
)
− fHLf(hHk−1)
]
+ fH∆f
k−1(1−∆f)
}
> 0
2The increase and decrease in our paper refer to the weak sense.
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As Λk increases with k, it indicates that the effect of capacity constraint at each
time point increases over time. The optimal quantity qi(hk) for hk ∈ {hHk , hLk } and
qH(h
Lˆ
k ) diminishes as Λk grows; while the trend of qL(h
Lˆ
k ) as k increases depends on
the mixed effects which are the decrement of fH∆θ
fL
( ∆f
fLL
)k(1− ∆f
fLL
) and the increment
of Λk − Λk−1. Additionally, the capacity constraint at each time point binds the
optimal quantity after any history hk. In Battaglini (2005), the uncapacitated
and infinite version of our problem, the optimal quantity converges to the efficient
quantity θi (θi − ad in our context) due to ∆ffLL < 1.
4.1.2 Different hire time preferences (d¯H > d¯L)
In this subsection, we discuss the problem with two types of customers hav-
ing different preferred hire time d¯H > d¯L. Unlike the previous section, there are
fixed but not equidistant time points in the finite horizon, {t0 = 0, t1 = d¯L, t2 =
d¯H , · · · , tK , tK+1 = T}. Assume that each customer has at most one rental con-
tract at any time point. The corresponding monopolist’s optimization problem
can be formulated as follows.
max
{Q,S(θ)}
M{
∑
i
fi(Pi − Y − ad¯iqi) +
K∑
k=1
δtkEhzk
∑
i
fzi[Pi − Y − ad¯iqi(hzk)]}
s.t. S(θi|hk) ≥ S(θj|hk) + ∆θqj(hk) + δd¯j
∑
l(fil − fjl)S(θl|hjk+1) ICij(hk)
S(θi|hk) ≥ 0 IRi(hk)
M(fHqH + fLqL) ≤ C CC(h0)
fzLqL(h
z
k) + fzHqH(h
z
k) ≤ qz(hk−1) hzk = {hk−1, z} CC(hk)
∀i, j, l ∈ {L,H}, hk ∈Hk (0 ≤ k ≤ K)
Note that 4θ = θH − θL = θ¯H d¯H − θ¯Ld¯L. The capacity constraint CC(hk)(k > 0)
in this model is different from that in the model of customers with the same hire
time. In the previous section, with equidistant time points, the available capacity
at each time point is C; whereas in this section, the time points in the horizon
are not equidistant anymore, the available capacity at time point tk is the number
of rented containers at tk−1, qz(hk−1). We still apply the relaxed method to solve
this problem.
Lemma 4.2. In a dynamic environment with different hire time preferences, the
optimal solution of the relaxed problem is also an optimal solution of the original
problem.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.1, except the part ICHL(hk)
when k > 0.
If ICHL(hk) are not binding constraints in an optimal solution {Q,P} of the
original problem for some hk ∈Hk, then S(θH |hk) = ∆θqL(hk)+δd¯L∆fS(θH |hLk+1)+
ω. Consider an alternative solution {Q′, S ′(θ)} such that S ′(θH |hk) = S(θH |hk)−ω.
When k > 0 and k′ > k, S ′(θH |hk′) remains the same as in the original
solution, S ′(θH |hk′) = S(θH |hk′). When k′ = k − 1, we have S ′(θH |hk−1) =
S(θH |hk−1)− δd¯Lω. By repeatedly applying the above modifications until k′ = 0,
S ′(θH) = S(θH) − δkd¯Lω. The expected optimal profit increases by MfHδkd¯Lω,
Π(Q′, S ′(θ)) = Π(Q,P )+MfHδkd¯Lω. It contradicts the optimality of the assump-
tion.
Use the Lagrange multiplier approach to reformulate the relaxed problem as
Π(Q,S(θH),Λ) = max{Q,S(θH),Λ}
M{
∑
i
fi[θiqi − 1
2
(q2i + d¯
2
i )− Y − ad¯iqi]− fHS(θH)
+
K∑
k=1
δtkEhzk
∑
i
fzi[θiqi(h
z
k)−
1
2
(q2i (h
z
k) + d¯
2
i )− Y − ad¯iqi(hzk)]}
+ λ0(
C
M
− fHqH − fLqL) +
K∑
k=1
λk[qz(hk−1)− fzLqL(hk)− fzHqH(hk)]
s.t. S(θL|hk) = 0 IRL(hk)
S(θH) = ∆θ
∑K
k=0(δ
d¯L∆f)kqL(h
Lˆ
k ) ICHL(hk)
∀i ∈ {L,H}, hk ∈Hk (0 ≤ k ≤ K)
Theorem 4.2. For any hk ∈ Hk, the optimal intertemporal allocation policy for
customers with different hire time preferences is characterized as follows.
At time 0,qH = θH − ad¯H − Λ0;qL = θL − ad¯L − fHfL ∆θ − Λ0; where Λ0 =
λ0
M
= [θL − a(fH d¯H + fLd¯L)− C
M
]+;
when hk ∈ {hHk , hLk }, qH(hk) = θH − ad¯H − Λk;qL(hk) = θL − ad¯L − Λk;
where Λk =
λk
Mδtkf(hk)
= [fzHθH + fzLθL − θz − a(fzH d¯H + fzLd¯L − d¯z) + Λk−1]+;
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when hk = h
Lˆ
k , qH(hLˆk ) = θH − ad¯H − Λk;qL(hLˆk ) = θL − ad¯L − fH∆θfL ( ∆ffLL )k − Λk;
where Λk =
λk
Mδkd¯Lf(hLˆk )
=
[
fLH(∆θ − ad¯H + ad¯L) + fH∆θfL (
∆f
fLL
)k−1(1−∆f) + Λk−1
]+
.
Proof. qi(hk) exists in the capacity constraints CC(hk) and CC(hk+1). CC(hk)
binds the optimal allocated quantity qi(hk), while CC(hk+1) decreases the binding
effect due to the returning process. Thus, we consider the optimal allocation policy
under the tightened binding capacity effect CC(hk). When hk ∈ {hHk , hLk }, the
first-order conditions w.r.t qH(hk) and qL(hk) are given by the following equations.
qH(hk) : Mδ
tkf(hk)[θH − ad¯H − qH(hk)]− λk = 0
qL(hk) : Mδ
tkf(hk)[θL − ad¯L − qL(hk)]− λk = 0
And Λk = [fzH(θH − ad¯H) + fzL(θL − ad¯L)− qz(hk−1)]+ = [fzHθH + fzLθL − θz −
a(fzH d¯H + fzLd¯L − d¯z) + Λk−1]+.
When hk = h
Lˆ
k , the first-order conditions w.r.t qH(h
Lˆ
k ) and qL(h
Lˆ
k ) are given by
the following equations.
qH(h
Lˆ
k ) : Mδ
tkf(hLˆk )[θH − ad¯H − qH(hLˆk )]− λk = 0
qL(h
Lˆ
k ) : Mδ
tkf(hLˆk )fLL[θL − ad¯L − qL(hLˆk )]− λkfLL −MδtkfH∆θ∆fk = 0
Λk =
[
fLH(θH − ad¯H) + fLL(θL − ad¯L − fH∆θfL (
∆f
fLL
)k)− qL(hLk−1)
]+
=
[
fLH(∆θ − ad¯H + ad¯L) + fH∆θfL (
∆f
fLL
)k−1(1−∆f) + Λk−1
]+
.
Corollary 4.2. For 0 ≤ k ≤ K and any hzk ∈Hk, if z = L, Λk increases with k;
if z = H, Λk decreases with k.
Proof. We prove this corollary by induction. To begin with, consider the case
z = L.
Step 1. For k = 1, h1 = { L} = hLˆ1 .
Λ1 − Λ0 = fLH(∆θ − ad¯H + ad¯L) + fH∆θ
fL
(1−∆f)
= fLH [d¯H(θ¯H − a)− d¯L(θL − a)] + fH∆θ
fL
(1−∆f)
> fLH(θL − a)(d¯H − d¯L) + fH∆θ
fL
(1−∆f) > 0
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The positivity is derived from θ¯L > a, d¯H > d¯L and ∆f = fHH − fLH < 1.
Step 2. If hk = h
L
k , Λk = [fLH(∆θ − ad¯H + ad¯L) + Λk−1]+; if hk = hLˆk ,
Λk = [fLH(∆θ−ad¯H+ad¯L)+ fH∆θfL (
∆f
fLL
)k−1(1−∆f)+Λk−1]+. As ∆θ−ad¯H+ad¯L > 0
and 1−∆f > 0, we have Λk ≥ Λk−1.
Consider the case when z = H. For k ∈ {1, · · · , K}, Λk = [−fHL(∆θ− ad¯H +
ad¯L) + Λk−1]+, hence Λk ≤ Λk−1.
In this subsection, it is interesting that the effect of capacity constraint becomes
smaller whenever the last customer type is the high type and this effect becomes
larger whenever the last customer type is the low type no matter the history is hLk
or hLˆk . In other words, the influence of capacity constraint depends only on the
realization of the customer type in the previous period. Based on the monotonicity
of Λk, the optimal quantity of the consistent high type converges to the efficient
quantity level (θH − ad¯H) over time. At the same time, the distortion of the
(highly consistent or inconsistent) low type customer becomes greater over time.
The situation that the effect of capacity constraints depends on customer type
contrasts with the effect of capacity constraint which is independent of customer
type in Section 4.1.1. For the case with same hire time preference, the capacity
constraint binds all the allocated quantities at each time point, while in this case
with different hire time preferences, the capacity constraint only takes effect on
the next allocation.
4.2 Hire quantity preference
Denote the preferred hire quantities of two customer types by q¯H and q¯L. We
first study the case that q¯H = q¯L and then discuss the case when q¯H > q¯L. Let
θi = θ¯iq¯i.
4.2.1 Same hire quantity preference (q¯H = q¯L = q)
In this section, we analyze the case that both customer types have the same
hire quantity preference. The monopolist’s problem is to determine a optimal hire
time sequence D = {di(h0), di(h1), · · · , di(hk)} for any hk ∈Hk (k = 0, 1, · · · , N)
to maximize the expected profit, where di(hk) is the hire time of customer type i
after history hk and N is the total number of rental contracts for history h
Lˆ
k in the
horizon. ti(hk) is the beginning time of rental contract for type i after history hk,
ti(hk) =
∑k−1
l=0 d(hl) (hl ∈ hk). The optimization problem in this setting is written
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as shown below.
Π(D,S(θ)) = max
{D,S(θ)}
M(
∑
i
fi[U(θi, di(h0))− S(θi)− Y − aqdi(h0)]
+
N∑
k=1
Ehzk
∑
j
δtj(h
z
k)fzj[U(θj, dj(h
z
k))− Y − aqdi(hzk)])
s.t. S(θi|hk) ≥ S(θj|hk) + ∆θdj(hk) + δdj(hk)
∑
l(fil − fjl)S(θl|hjk+1) ICij(hk)
S(θi|hk) ≥ 0 IRi(hk)
ti(hk) + di(hk) ≤ T
∀i, j, l ∈ {L,H}, hk ∈Hk(0 ≤ k ≤ N)
The last constraint is the finite time constraint for hire time sequence D with
respect to hk. That is, for any hk ∈Hk, the summation of the hire time of all rental
contracts cannot exceed the planning horizon T . As customers have hire quantity
preference, there is no capacity constraint for the problem. Unfortunately, as the
following example shows, even N = 2, a closed form solution is unlikely derivable.
Example (N=2) Suppose that at time t0 = 0 the types of all arriving cus-
tomers are H, then at time point t1 = dH(h0), the hire time for the low type and
the high type are θL− aq and θH − aq, respectively. The objective function of the
monopolist is
Π(D,S(θ)) = max
dH(h0)
MfH{θHdH(h0)− 1
2
(d2H(h0) + q
2)− Y − aq¯HdH(h0)
+
1
2
δdH(h0)pi(θH , θL)}
where pi(θH , θL) = fHH(θ
2
H−a2q2)+fHL(θ2L−a2q2)−q2. The first order condition
w.r.t dH(h0) is
θH − aq − dH(h0) + 1
2
δdH(h0) ln dH(h0)pi(θH , θL) = 0
As dH(h0) lies in the exponent, the above equation is a transcendental equation
which does not exist a closed form solution. The first decision variable di(h0)
influences all the following decision variables di(hk) (k = 1, · · · , N). This con-
trasts with the problem in a dynamic environment when customers have hire time
preference. Because in the problem discussed in Section 4.1 the decision variable
such as qi(hk) only affects the next decision variables qi(hk+1) through available
capacity constraint rather than all subsequent decision variables.
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In view of this, we limit the choices of possible hire time. Suppose that the
alternative hire time sets for both types are DL = {d1L, d2L, · · · , dKL } and DH =
{d1H , d2H , · · · , dKH}, where dk+1i > dki (i ∈ {L,H}), d1H > dKL and |DL| = |DH | = K.
Due to the given hire time set, there may exist some idle time after the last rental
contract as the remaining time in the planning horizon is less than the minimum
given hire time d1L. Let κ be the set of the last rental contract for each hk in the
planning horizon and the unit inventory cost per time period be c¯. For short, let
R(di(hk)) = θidi(hk) − 12(d2i (hk) + q2) − Y − aqdi(hk). d∗i = arg maxdi∈Di{R(di)}
refers to the efficient hire time of type i. Thus, the problem degenerates into
selecting an optimal hire time from the given hire time set.
We still consider the relaxed problem where ICHL(hk) and IRL(hk) are binding
constraints.
Π(D,S(θH)) =
max
{D,S(θH)}
M{
∑
i∈{L,H}
fi[R(di(h0))− S(θH)] +
N∑
k=1
Ehzk
∑
j∈{L,H}
δtj(h
z
k)fzjR(dj(h
z
k))}
− c¯
∑
j∈κ
Ehk(T − tj(hk) + dj(hk))
s.t. S(θL|hk) = 0 IRL(hk)
S(θH) = ∆θ
∑N
k=0 δ
tL(h
Lˆ
k )∆fkdL(h
Lˆ
k ) ICHL(hk)
tj(hk) + dj(hk) ≤ T, j ∈ κ
∀hk ∈Hk(0 ≤ k ≤ N)
We use a binary tree (see Figure 1) to illustrate the computation process. Node
t = 0 is the beginning of the binary tree. Nodes with odd numbers represent the
low type customers and nodes with even numbers denote the high type customers.
Let l be a general node in the tree and ϑ(l) be the type of that node. If l mod 2 = 1,
ϑ(l) = L; if l mod 2 = 0, ϑ(l) = H. For short, let hl be the history ended at node
l and tl be the beginning time of rental contract at node l. The objective function
of this problem implies that given the alternative hire time sets, there is a trade-
off between efficient hire discount of current state and future profit maximization.
For a node in tree, if the efficient hire time dϑ(l)(hk) = d
∗
ϑ(l) is selected by the
leasing company, then the next rental contracts for both types are available from
time tl +d
∗
ϑ(l); if the hire time of node l is less than the efficient hire time d
∗
ϑ(l), the
next rental contracts start earlier than the former case at the cost of sacrificing
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the profit at the current state. The optimal hire time sequence strikes a balance
between current state maximization and expected future profit maximization.
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Figure 1. A Binary Tree, d∗L = 8, d
∗
H = 12 and T = 25
The dynamic programming algorithm is designed in the following way. First
assign the efficient hire time of both types to the corresponding nodes until the
second last contracts of different histories and calculate the hire time of last rental
contract for each history subject to the time constraint. For example, in Figure
1, assign d∗L = 8 for odd nodes and d
∗
H = 12 for even nodes except the last rental
contract. For this feasible solution, let κ(l) be the set of last rental contract for each
history rooted at node l and V (l) be a subtree rooted at node l. V (l) can be divided
into two sets, V (l) = {Va(l), Vn(l)}, where Va(l) = {k|k ∈ κ(l) and dϑ(k)(htk) 6=
d∗ϑ(k)} is the set of nodes in κ(l) whose hire time do not equal to the efficient
hire time of the corresponding types and Vn(l) = V (l) \ Va(l) is the set of rest
nodes in V (l) whose hire time equal to the efficient hire time of the corresponding
types. Next, for each node with efficient hire time, adjust this feasible solution
by decreasing node l by η and increasing nodes j in Va(l) by η. Let ∆l(η) be the
net change of the expected profit which includes the changes of expected profit of
hire time at nodes l and j ∈ Va(l), the changes of the expected profit for nodes
j ∈ Vn(l) whose hire time remain the same, the changes of inventory cost of nodes
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in κ(l) and the possible change of S(θH).
∆l(η) =f(hl)δ
tl [R(dϑ(l)(hl)− η)−R(dϑ(l)(hl))] +
∑
j∈Vn(l)
f(hj)δ
tjR(dϑ(j)(hj))(δ
−η − 1)
+
∑
j∈Va(l)
f(hj)[R(dϑ(j)(hj) + η)δ
tj−η −R(dϑ(j)(hj))δtj ]
+ c¯
∑
k∈κ(l)\Va(l)
f(hk)δ
tk(T − tk − dϑ(k)(hk) + η)− fH4θ4l(S(θH))
where 4l(S(θH)) = 1(l ∈ hLˆk )[−η4fkδtl +
∑N
j=k+14f jδtL(h
Lˆ
j )dL(h
Lˆ
j )(δ
−η − 1) +
1(hLˆj ∩ Va(l))η4fNδtL(h
Lˆ
j )−η].
Compute ∆l(ηmin) where ηlmin = mink∈{2,··· ,K}{dkϑ(l)−dk−1ϑ(l)} and ∆(ηlmax) where
ηlmax = min{d∗ϑ(l)−d1ϑ(l),minj∈Va(l){d∗ϑ(j)−dϑ(j)(htj)}}. η∗l = arg max{∆l(η)|∆l(η) >
0}. If η∗l is not empty set, then adjust the feasible solution, otherwise continue to
next node. Subtrees V (l) rooted at the same level can be calculated separately
since the above adjustment does not affect the solution of other subtrees with the
same level, e.g., V (1) and V (2). Apply the adjustment repeatedly until η∗l is an
empty set for each node in V (l) \ κ(l).
Numerical Example 1. Consider an intertemporal nonlinear pricing prob-
lem in the planning horizon T = 25 with different time discount factors δ =
0.95, 0.85, 0.65. There are M = 10 customers with same hire quantity preference
q = 5. The high type customer with valuation θ¯H = 3.6 arrives at the system with
probability fH = 0.6 at time 0 and with consistent probability fHH = 0.6 during
the rest of planning horizon. The low type customer with valuation θ¯L = 2.6
enters the system with inconsistent probability fLH = 0.45. The alternative hire
time sets for both types are DL = [5, 6, 7, 8] and DH = [9, 10, 11, 12]. Contract
setup cost Y is 4, the unit inventory cost c¯ is 0.5 and the unit operating cost a is
0.6. The optimal hire time sequence is shown in Figure 2.
Numerical Example 2. In this example, the valuations of both two types
become θ¯H = 2.8 and θ¯L = 2. The other parameters remain the same. The
optimal hire time sequence is illustrated in Figure 3.
Two interesting points can be drawn from these two examples. The first one
is that when δ decreases, the optimal hire time sequence converges to the efficient
hire time (The efficient hire time for both types are d∗H = 12, d
∗
L = 8 in Exam-
ple 1 and d∗H = 11, d
∗
L = 7 in Example 2). The lessening time discount factor
reduces the proportion of future profit in the total expected profit which results
in the dominant effect of current profit maximization in the tradeoff. As the time
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Figure 2. The Optimal Hire Time Sequence of Example 1, θ¯H = 3.6 and θ¯L = 2.6
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Figure 3. The Optimal Hire Time Sequence of Example 2, θ¯H = 2.8 and θ¯L = 2
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discount factor diminishes, it is optimal for the leasing company to lease the con-
tainers at the efficient hire time in order to maximize the expected profit. In the
two examples, when δ falls from from 0.95 to 0.65, the optimal hire time sequence
except the last rental contract has the trend of converging to the efficient hire
time.
Another finding is that the decrement of customer valuations lessens the effect
of current profit maximization. In Example 1, (θ¯i − a)q (θH = 15, θL = 10) is
greater than the maximal alternative hire time dKi (d
K
H = 12, d
K
L = 8); in Example
2, d1i < (θ¯i − a)q < dKi . The decreasing customer valuation leads to the reducing
efficient hire time. Thus, the opportunity cost of leasing the containers at the
efficient hire time reduces, which weakens the effect of efficient hire discount. The
effect of future profit maximization becomes dominant in the trade-off. This is the
reason that even δ = 0.65, the optimal hire time of nodes 1 and 3 in Example 2 are
5 and 6 which are less than the efficient hire time of low type, d∗L = 7. In a word,
(θ¯i − a)q is the main factor of deciding the effect of current state maximization
and δ is the major determinant of the effect of future profit maximization.
4.2.2 Different hire quantity preferences (q¯H > q¯L)
We further investigate the case that customers have different hire quantity
preferences, q¯H > q¯L. In the previous section, because of the same hire quan-
tity preference, there is no container left except the last rental contract in the
planning horizon, whereas the varied hire quantity preferences in this section give
rise to the phenomenon that after each rental contract, there may be several ex-
cess/inadequate units of container. Suppose that the consistent type customers
have the priority of satisfying the demand and the inconsistent low type customers
(the low type customer of last time changes to the high type customer) are patient
and can wait until when idle containers are available. If hzk = h
H
k , Mf(h
z
k)q¯H units
of container are returned at ti(h
z
k)(i ∈ {L,H}). The total number of requested
containers by both types is Mf(hzk)(fHH q¯H + fHLq¯L) which is strictly less than
the units of available container Mf(hzk)q¯H . It implies that Mf(h
z
k)fHL(q¯H − q¯L)
units of container are left in the company; if hzk ∈ {hLˆk , hLk }, Mf(hzk)q¯L units
of container are returned at time ti(h
z
k)(i ∈ {L,H}). The consistent low type
customer requires Mf(hzk)fLLq¯L, which is less than Mf(h
z
k)q¯L. But the incon-
sistent low type customer requests Mf(hzk)fLH q¯H which is greater than the rest
of container, Mf(hzk)fLH q¯L. Assume that the waiting cost per time is w. xi(hk)
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represents the inventory level of containers for customer type i after history hk.
Let R(di(hk)) = θidi(hk) − 12((d2i (hk) + q¯2i ) − Y − aq¯idi(hk). The corresponding
relaxed optimization problem can be formulated as
Π(D,S(θH)) = max{D,S(θH)}
M
∑
i
fi[R(di(h0))− S(θi)] +M
N∑
k=1
Ehzk
∑
j
δtj(h
z
k)fzjR(dj(hk))
− c¯Ehk(xi(hk))+ − wEhk1(tj(hk)− ti(hk))(xi(hk))−
s.t. S(θL|hk) = 0 IRL(hk)
S(θH) = ∆θ
∑N
k=0 δ
tL(h
Lˆ
k )∆fkdL(h
Lˆ
k ) ICHL(hk)
ti(hk) + di(hk) ≤ T
∀i, j ∈ {L,H},∀hk ∈Hk(0 ≤ k ≤ N)
The objective function in this section is the rental revenue minus inventory cost,
operating cost and waiting cost. The other components are the same as the model
in the previous section.
The differences between this section and previous section are that (1) subtrees
with the same level jointly determine the optimal hire time sequence. For example,
the hire time of node 2 affects the available time of idle containers for inconsistent
low type customer at node 4; (2) Besides the finite time constraint of the planning
horizon, there exist hire quantity constraints for inconsistent low type customer
due to different hire quantity preferences, which incurs the inventory cost and
waiting cost. While in Section 4.2.1, there is only inventory cost after the last
rental contract. The changes of the algorithm are the inclusions of ∆l(η) for
nodes l in V (2) and the waiting/inventory cost of each node. The other parts
remain the same.
Numerical Example 3. The preferred hire time for both types are q¯H = 10
and q¯L = 5. The waiting cost per time w is 1. The other parameters are the
same as in Example 1. The optimal hire time sequence is shown in Figure 4. The
number in triangle denotes the preferred hire quantity requested by customers,
Mf(hzk)fziq¯i (z, i ∈ {L,H}).
Compared the result in Example 3 with the result in Example 1, one impli-
cation for high type customers is that the optimal hire time are the efficient hire
time, d∗H = 12 and are insensitive to the variation of time discount factor. This is
because the preferred hire quantity of high type in this example is q¯H = 10, the
profit from high type customer becomes larger than that in Example 1. The effect
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Figure 4. The Optimal Hire Time Sequence of Example 3, q¯H = 10 and q¯L = 5
of efficient hire discount (current state profit maximization) dominates the effect
of future profit maximization. In addition, considering different hire quantity pref-
erences, there is inventory left for high type customers. Thus, it is optimal for the
leasing company to lease containers for high type customers at the efficient hire
time. The second implication is that the optimal hire time of low type customers
at node 1 is longer than that in Example 1, while the result at node 3 has the
opposite trend. The most likely explanation is as follows. Nodes 4 and 8 are in-
consistent low type customers. In the optimal solution, customers at node 4 wait
until customers at node 2 return containers. The waiting cost of node 4 depends
on the difference between the hire time of node 2 and 1. Then it is reasonable to
increase the hire time of node 1 in order to reduce the waiting cost. But customers
at node 8 are refused by the leasing company due to long waiting time and the
finite horizon time constraint. For node 2, there are 12 units excess inventory.
Among them, 9 units is used to satisfy the demand of node 4 and 2.97 units is
used to meet the demand of node 18. The hire time of node 3 affects the inventory
cost of 2.97 units, thus the optimal hire time of node 3 is less than the efficient
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hire time so as to minimize the time lag between node 2 and node 3 and reduce
the inventory cost.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore the monopolist’s nonlinear pricing problems in static
and dynamic environments in the context of container leasing industry. In a static
environment, we obtain the closed-form solutions for the capacity-constrained non-
linear pricing problems under different customer groups with multiple types. In a
dynamic environment, we concentrate on two customer types in each group. The
optimal closed-form solutions are derived for customers with hire time preference.
The capacity constraint has distinct effects when customers have same or different
hire time preference(s). For customers with preferred hire quantity, on the given
alternative hire time sets, we use dynamic programming approach to obtain the
numerical optimal solution.
To simplify the analysis, this study has made several assumptions, for example
only two customer types are considered in a dynamic environment, hire time and
quantity are not determined jointly, and total capacity is fixed. The future work
could extend the nonlinear pricing problem from the following perspectives: (1)
multidimensional screening problem under both static and dynamic environments,
that is, the monopolist decides optimal hire time and quantity simultaneously; (2)
include the competition effect into the model; (3) consider the capacity expansion
in the planning horizon; (4) analyze the model with finitely many customer types.
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